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Steve Fuller, Science (Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010), ISBN: 978-1844652044 
 
It is difficult to approach Steve Fuller’s work without invoking the debate over the teaching of 
evolution versus ”intelligent design” theory (ID).  Notably, in the 2005 Kitzmiller et al v. Dover 
lawsuit, Fuller testified in favor of ID as a legitimate science and deserving of a place in public 
school curricula.  Thus, Acumen Publishing’s selection of Fuller to author a philosophical trea-
tise on science seems perplexing, given his virulent opposition to what he deems as ”in-
stitutional” science’s authoritarian structure.1 
Acumen’s Art of Living series asks the broad question ”How should we live?” and in-
cludes titles ranging from love and hope to money and distraction.  The goal of the series is to 
bring philosophy, penned by notable authors, to the general public.  Acumen’s website 
(www.acumenpublishing.co.uk) notes that authors ”draw on their own personal reflections to 
write philosophy that seeks to enrich, stimulate, and challenge the reader’s thoughts about 
their own life.”  The description of Fuller’s Science, on the Acumen website as well as the back 
cover, showcases an examination of the conflation of science and faith.  Science, the blurb re-
lates, ”is [only] now undergoing its own version of secularization” with the universal trust in 
”science priests” waning in favor of a movement (which Fuller terms ”Protscience”) of lay-
scientists and alternative practitioners of medicine ”claiming scientific authority as their own.” 
The description sets the stage for a ”challenging and provocative” book; one which hints at a 
fresh view of the structures of institutional science as seen through institutional faith. 
The polemical tone of the opening sentences, however, somewhat belies the notion of, 
if you will, a fair and balanced examination of science and the underlying question of ”How 
should we live [with science]?” 
 
The pursuit of science is more often defended for what it makes possible than for what it 
actually does.  In fact, what science actually does is readily seen as hard, boring, dangerous 
and often morally dubious. (5) 
 
Chapter One (”The gospel according to Dr. Strangelove”) reminds us that science is re-
sponsible for countless historical atrocities, in experimentation as well as in practice.  It’s diffi-
cult to argue with Fuller here, though the absence of science’s positive aspects is conspicuous.  
                                                 
1 For a more complete discussion of the Dover case as well as Fuller’s stated views on ID, see: Kevin Lam-
bert, “Fuller’s Folly, Kuhnian Paradigms, and Intelligent Design,” Social Studies of Science 36, no. 6 (Dec. 
2006): 835-842. 
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Fuller quickly asserts that he is not attempting to cast science in a negative light, but rather, he 
seeks to ”redress any biases the reader might bring.” (6)  It is here we encounter the heart of 
Fuller’s thesis, reinforced throughout the substantive body of Science: science is, in actuality, a 
faith based on the ”familiar theologically inspired idea about the cognitively privileged place 
of humans in the cosmos” and moreover, science can specifically thank Abraham and the 
Abrahamic tradition for its existence at all. (6)  The remainder of the opening chapter is spent 
situating scientific enquiry as merely the by-product of theological scaffolding, continually 
rotating examples from the Christian Bible while notably excluding examples from Judaism 
and Islam, both initially mentioned as part of the Abrahamic tradition and then discarded.  
Rather than foregrounding the promised questions in the book’s description (”Can science 
give a sense of completeness to one’s life?  Can it account for the entirety of what it is to be 
human?  What does our continuing belief in scientific progress say about us as a species?”), 
careful as well as casual readers alike will quickly grasp the elevation of institutional religion 
over science as morally and pragmatically superior. 
The rhetorical structure of the complete text follows this pattern closely.  Chapter Two 
(”Can science live with its past?”) ties the roots of all modern knowledge to theology, while 
simultaneously excoriating figures who support a separation of scientific and theological 
systems.  Fuller derides the notion that Abrahamic faiths can ”coexist with the atheistic natu-
ralism behind Darwin’s theory of evolution.” (30)  Here, as with Science’s numerous anti-
Darwinian and pro-Newtonian binarizations, we are presented less with an examination of the 
intersections and interstices of faith and science and more with an outright attack on Dar-
winism as the generalized subtext of all science; in this way, readers are encouraged to believe 
that no other scientific models exist. 
Chapter Three (”Styles of living scientifically: a tale of three nations”) relates more ex-
plicitly science’s point of origin as Christian, stating a belief that the mental discipline required 
to engage with a scientific life can be atheistic is fundamentally incorrect because ”on the 
contrary, the earliest precedent for the austerity demanded of a life in science is Christian 
monasticism.” (48)  Totalizing, originary statements like this consistently problematize Fuller’s 
conclusions, as does the insistence that the scientific ”art of living” is a actually a recapi-
tulation of ”stages in the history of Christianity.” (61)  If we are to assume that, for example, 
the aforementioned assertion is foundationally accurate, are we then to understand science 
and faith are inextricably tied as one, or might we see their structural similarities as 
disciplinary mechanisms, separate from ideological signification?  The substantive structure of 
Science would have us believe only the former.  This structural issue is perhaps most clear in 
Chapter Four (”We are all scientists now: the rise of Protscience”). 
Fuller’s concept of Protscience is intriguing.  Viewing science as an authoritarian gate-
keeper of knowledge, he relates the Protestant movement to recover ”the original biblical spi-
rit behind centuries of encrusted tradition and ritual” to, (62) as he calls them, modern ”cul-
tural movements” like postmodernism and poststructuralism. (67)  Chapter Four extols the 
virtues of the ”public understanding of science” while again rejecting the ”traditional” dis-
cursive formation of science.  Unfortunately, Fuller’s closed structure still requires the reader 
to accept a Christian framework in order to see Protscience as an object of discourse.  Fuller 
contends that authors such as Foucault, Derrida, and Lyotard have subverted ”authorized 
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readings of canonical texts—by, say, Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger,” but only 
insofar as they have ”taken the Bible’s place in higher education.” (67)  Thus, we are again left 
with the understanding that science (in this case, the human sciences) is inseparable from 
Christian theology.  In order to accept Fuller’s thesis, we must accept Christian history and 
dogma as the foundational and originary structure.  In this way, any ground gained by ques-
tioning the basic structure of science is subsumed by a thinly veiled ID agenda. 
A rather heavy-handed Christian foundationalism permeates the remainder of Science. 
Chapter Five (”The scientific ethic and the spirit of literalism”) begins with an account of a 
”scientific” reckoning (via the Bible) of the ”exact date of creation,” (72) as well as incidentally 
containing another exhortation for public funding of intelligent design. (77)  Fuller suggests 
that science is fundamentally weak because of the lack of a unifying theory: 
 
Paleontology, ecology, genetics and molecular biology constitute more a confederation than a 
federal (let alone unitary) system of scientific governance.  They are united only when under 
collective attack (e.g. by creationists or intelligent design proponents) but remain separate in 
peacetime.  Thus, the response that a paleontologist would normally give to how findings in 
his field relate to those in molecular biology vis-à-vis evolution is likely to be rather different 
from the molecular biologist’s view of how his findings relate to those in paleontology. (80) 
 
The subsequent paragraph advises intelligent design proponents to take on the branches of 
biological sciences separately and push specifically for absolutes like ”(i) when did the various 
species come into being, and (ii) by what means did they come into being?” (81)  Any diffe-
rences between scientific methodology (testing) as a determinant as compared to Biblically 
based conclusions are dismissed.  It seems dangerously oversimplified to suggest they are the 
same, yet this is the most prevalent theme in Fuller’s text. 
The longest in the book, Chapter Six (”What has atheism—old or new—ever done for 
science?”), examines the distinction between atheism and what Fuller terms ”Atheism.”  In 
order to earn the capitalized signification and ”go beyond the mere denial of certain religious 
authorities” (presumably a legitimizing action), Atheism ”must be something more than a po-
sition that retains all the key metaphysical assumptions of monotheism.” (94)  Perhaps above 
all, this chapter holds the most hope for what was promised in Science’s write-up.  We find, 
however, only reinforcement of familiar arguments: ad hominem attacks on Darwin (100-102) 
and Richard Dawkins, (97) the binarization of good religion versus evil science, (108) and the 
conflation of the religious beliefs of historical individuals and their research and conclusions, 
(110) all leading to the ”natural” conclusion that science ”requires some personal engagement 
with the specifically cognitive demands of religion.”2 (111; my emphasis)  Perhaps the most 
problematical concept—as well as being foundational to Fuller’s totalizing argument—holds 
that ”Atheism has not figured as a force in the history of science not because it has been 
                                                 
2 Fuller writes: “To be clear, by “the specifically cognitive demands of religion,” I mean three core meta-
physical ideas about the nature of reality that inform the Abrahamic faiths, on which the New Atheists 
continue to trade: namely, that reality as a whole constitutes (i) a universe (not simply multiple realities) 
with (ii) ontological depth (not simply the sum of direct experience), all of which is (iii) potentially intel-
ligible to the human mind, by virtue of our (divinely?) privileged place in reality.” 
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suppressed but because whenever it has been expressed, it has not specifically encouraged the 
pursuit of science.” (111)  At the risk of belabouring this point, again we encounter the notion 
that, in order to agree or disagree with Fuller’s claims, his structural configurations (in this 
case, that Atheism is an organization on par with science or religion) must be adhered to. 
Chapter Seven (”Science as an instrument of divine justice”) places the root of theodicy 
in intelligent design, (113) in addition to asserting that ”the laws of probability were originally 
presented as a divine instrument for harnessing the unruliness of matter in aid of intelligent 
design.  Thus, the guiding dichotomy here was not design versus not-design but good design ver-
sus bad design.” (114)  This is an interesting claim, though one supported merely by a single re-
ference to Reverend Thomas Bayes.3  We find Biblical commentators inventing the scientific 
method, (126) a return to the wholly authoritarian structure of science, (129) and the claim that 
science ”only” makes sense in light of Adam’s relationship with God (131-132) in Chapter 
Eight (”Scientific progress as secular providence”).  Science closes by asking if science can 
change the future without undoing the past, fearing an obsolescence of religion and nicely 
contextualizing the previous chapters.  The final thoughts predictably encapsulate Fuller’s ar-
gument, while at the same time commending the ”sensibility” of faith: 
 
There is something profoundly irrational in hitching one’s fate to a theory in which all that is 
meaningful is ultimately based on chance-based processes, the plausibility of which depend 
on an ever-expanding and aging universe.  In contrast, once an outer limit is placed on the 
age, size and shape of the universe, which in turn makes it easier to argue sensibly about 
how the world can be regarded as a just place, Atheism and maybe even agnosticism 
become less plausible as orientations to the world. (146) 
 
In Science, Fuller discusses a wealth of interesting topics, though his points are grounded 
exclusively in a Christian, specifically Protestant, framework and lacking in supporting scho-
larship.  All too often, the lack of evidential support, fundamentalist assertions, and steady 
stream of negativity toward (the perception of) ”Darwinian” science and scientists, alternately 
with praise only for those with Christian leanings, fosters a disquieting air.  Readers seeking 
the viewpoint and foundational arguments of the intelligent design movement will find useful 
information; those seeking a less polemical and antagonistic view of the interrelation of faith 
and science will likely be frustrated.  It would seem that Science, while ostensibly aimed at car-
rying philosophy to the general public, has a quite highly specific agenda. 
 
Pete Figler 
University of Arizona 
1423 E. University Blvd. Rm. 445 
Modern Languages Building 
                                                 
3 While there is a final chapter in Science called “Further Reading,” there is only one citation in the entirety of 
the substantive text, appearing four pages before the close of the final chapter.  Fuller represents that he has 
drawn from a wealth of materials, though the absence of direct linking evidence in the substantive text is 
troubling; we are to take his claims and their evidential support purely at his word, creating great difficulties 
in verification. 
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